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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : Case No. 920850-CA 
v. : 
CLAUDE L. HAYES, : Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from a judgment and conviction by a jury 
of aggravated robbery, a first degree felony, in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (1990). 
This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(k) (Supp. 1992), as the appeal has 
been transferred to this Court from the Utah Supreme Court (a 
copy of the order of the Supreme Court is attached as Addendum 
A). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
1. Was the evidence sufficient to support a conviction 
for the crime of aggravated robbery? On appeal, this claim is 
evaluated by viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to 
the jury's verdict. State v. Lemons, 844 P.2d 378, 378 (Utah 
App. 1992); State v. Perdue, 813 P.2d 1201, 1202 (Utah App. 
1991). Accord State v. Burk. 839 P.2d 880, 884 (Utah App. 1992). 
Reversal is warranted "only when the evidence, so viewed, is 
sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable that 
reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that 
the defendant committed the crime of which he was convicted." 
Burk, 839 P.2d at 884 (quoting State v. Salas, 820 P.2d 1386, 
1387 (Utah App- 1991)); see also State v. Whittle, 780 P.2d 819, 
821 (Utah 1989)- Accord State v. Vigil, 840 P.2d 788, 792-93 
(Utah App. 1992) . 
2. Did the trial court properly refuse to suppress 
defendant's spontaneous pre-Miranda confession after finding that 
it was not the result of custodial interrogation? "This Court 
reviews the factual findings underlying the denial of a motion to 
suppress evidence under a 'clearly erroneous' standard, and 
reviews the trial court's conclusions of law based thereon for 
correctness." State v. Gray, 211 Utah Adv. Rep. 40, 41 (Utah 
App. Apr. 22, 1993) (quoting State v. Brooks, 209 Utah Adv. Rep. 
43 (Utah App. Mar. 22, 1993)); see also State v. Brown, 201 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 4, 6 (Utah Nov. 30, 1992). The ultimate question of 
whether police words or actions were, under the totality of the 
circumstances, so likely to evoke an incriminating response that 
they constitute interrogation under Miranda is a factual 
determination reviewed for clear error. Lavton City v. Aragon, 
813 P.2d 1213, 1215-16 (Utah App. 1991); see State v. Singer, 815 
P.2d 1303, 1311-12 (Utah App. 1991). But see United States v. 
Wauneka, 770 F.2d 1434, 1438 (9th Cir. 1985) (the issue is a 
mixed question of law and fact). 
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (1990): 
(1) A person commits aggravated robbery if in the 
course of committing robbery, he: 
(a) uses or threatens to use a 
dangerous weapon as defined in Section 76-1-
601; or 
(b) causes serious bodily injury upon 
another. 
(2) Aggravated robbery is a first degree felony. 
(3) For the purposes of this part, an act shall 
be considered to be "in the course of committing a 
robbery" if it occurs in an attempt to commit, during 
the commission of, or in the immediate flight after the 
attempt or commission of a robbery. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-301 (1990): 
(1) Robbery is the unlawful and intentional 
taking of personal property in the possession of 
another from his person, or immediate presence, against 
his will, accomplished by means of force or fear. 
(2) Robbery is a felony of the second degree. 
The text of any other relevant constitutional, 
statutory or rule provisions pertinent to the resolution of the 
issues presented on appeal is contained in the body of this 
brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant Claude L. Hayes was charged by information 
with one count of aggravated robbery, a first degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (1990) (R. 2-4). The jury 
found defendant guilty as charged (R. 66). The court ordered 
preparation of a presentence report (Trial Transcript, Volume II 
[hereinafter "Tr. I or IIM] at 94), and subsequently sentenced 
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defendant to serve the statutory term of five years to life in 
the Utah State Prison (R. 71-74). Defendant timely appealed to 
the Utah Supreme Court which transferred the matter to this Court 
by order dated December 15, 1992 (Addendum A). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The facts are recited in the light most favorable to 
the jury's verdict. State v. Gray, 211 Utah Adv. Rep. 40 (Utah 
App. Apr. 22f 1993); State v. Burk, 839 P.2d 880, 882 (Utah App. 
1992); see also State v. Whittle, 780 P.2d 819, 820 (Utah 1989). 
The only robbery in Ogden, Utah, on June 16, 1991, 
occurred shortly before 10:00 p.m. at the Kar Kwik convenience 
store at Seventh and Washington (Tr. I at 12, 15, 117-18). 
Nineteen-year-old Anthea Benally and eighteen-year-old Brent Hoth 
were on duty at the time (Tr. I at 12-13, 15-16, 28-29, 61). 
Defendant, a thirty-one year old black bus driver, entered the 
store at a time when no other customers were present (Tr. I at 
15, 187). He took some time to select a bag of chips and asked 
Mrs. Benally to get him a package of cigarettes from behind the 
counter (Tr. I at 15-17, 34). The store was brightly lit and 
Mrs. Benally had an unobstructed view of defendant as she dealt 
with him (Tr. I at 32-34). When Mrs. Benally turned from the 
counter to ring up the sale on the nearby cash register, 
defendant stepped around the counter and told her, "This is a 
robbery" (Tr. I at 18-19, 34). Mrs. Benally laughed at what she 
thought was a joke (Tr. I at 19, 34). Defendant grabbed her arm, 
threatened her with a pair of scissors and told her, "Open up the 
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till now or else I'm going to stab you and then go for your 
partner" (Tr. I at 19-20, 34, 65-66). While defendant held the 
scissors only five inches from Mrs. Benally's stomach, she 
struggled to open the till (Tr. I at 20-21, 65). At this point, 
Hoth approached the counter from the opposite end of the store 
where he had been cleaning when defendant came in (Tr. I at 15, 
21, 63-65). When the till finally opened, defendant let go of 
Mrs. Benally's arm, grabbed approximately $300.00 in bills from 
the open till and stuffed them in his jacket pocket (Tr. I at 22-
23, 66). He warned Hoth and Mrs. Benally not to call the police, 
then told them "to get on your feet" (Tr. I at 23, 66). When 
Mrs. Benally pointed out that they were already on their feet, 
defendant turned and left the store (Tr. I at 23-24, 66). 
Neither Hoth nor Mrs. Benally could see him once he exited the 
store because it was so dark outside, and neither gave chase (Tr. 
I at 24, 34-35, 66). 
Mrs. Benally immediately phoned the police and 
described the robber to them (Tr. I at 25, 36-37).x Officers 
arrived at the store within ten minutes (Tr. I at 36), and 
thereafter took her to a street corner where they asked her to 
1
 The description she initially gave over the phone was not 
made part of the record. The testimony indicated only that the 
"general description" she gave on the phone included the robber's 
height, skin color, and dark blue "slick" jacket (Tr. I at 37, 
152). The description she later gave at the police station was 
included in her written statement and was read into the record: 
"He was black, late 20's, early 30's, 5'10" or 5'11", medium build, 
[and had] short curly black hair. He had just a little bit of 
facial hair. He was wearing a dark blue slick kind of like a rain 
jacket. It had a lining [that] was light color[ed]. Dark colored, 
mostly Levi's [sic]." (Tr. I at 55-56). 
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look at a suspect, subsequently identified as Melvin White (Tr. I 
at 25, 38-39), She thought White was similar to the robber in 
height and age but said the robber wore a different jacket (Tr. I 
at 26, 40-42, 48). Because of the lighting, she had them move 
White into the headlights of the police car (Tr. I at 41-4 2, 48). 
She then identified him as the robber, but told the police that 
he had changed his jacket since the robbery thirty minutes 
earlier (Tr. I at 25-26, 39, 42, 48). White and the store 
employees were taken separately to the police station where Mrs. 
Benally saw White walking down a lighted hallway (Tr. I at 42-44, 
153). She then gave a written statement to the police in which 
she again indicated that she thought White was the robber (Tr. I 
at 26, 43-50) . 
Detective John Stubbs was in charge of the robbery 
investigation and completed the initial investigation around 2:00 
a.m. the morning of June 17 (Tr. I at 115, 121-22, 149). At 4:00 
a.m. that morning, Gayle Herrera walked into the police station 
and was taken to Detective Stubbs (Tr. I at 84, 122). She asked 
him if there had been a robbery earlier that night (Tr. 122). 
Ignoring her question, Stubbs told her to say what she had to say 
and they'd take it from there (.id.). She explained that earlier 
that night she had been driving around with a man she had met a 
couple of days earlier (Tr. I at 84-85). They had been using 
cocaine and were looking to buy more (.id.)* They stopped "in the 
back of Kar Kwik" where the man told her that he was going to go 
borrow money from relatives nearby and that she should wait for 
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him in the car (Tr. I at 86-87). He left and returned fifteen 
minutes later at a run and looking sweaty and scared (Tr. I at 
87-88). When he got into the car, he had money and said, "What 
did I do with them [sic] scissors?" (Tr. I at 89, 93-94). She 
gave a description of the man's Buick Riviera and three numbers 
from the license plate, a description of his clothing which 
included a blue jacket, and a physical description which "fit 
very close" to Mrs. Benally's verbal description of the robber 
(Tr. I at 85-89, 91, 93-94, 124, 125). She could not remember 
the man's name, only that she thought he was called "K.K." and 
had a short last name beginning with a C. (Tr. I at 91-92, 124). 
The police tried that day to locate a suspect with a name 
matching Herrera's description (Tr. I at 124). When their 
efforts failed, Detective Stubbs called Herrera back to his 
office on June 18 (Tr. I at 124-25). She took Stubbs directly to 
a Clearfield apartment rented by defendant's brother, pointed out 
the gray Buick Riviera, gave him the number of the apartment she 
had been at with defendant on June 16th, and, when the 
registration check on the car came back with defendant's name, 
verified the name as that of the man she was with on the 16th 
(Tr. I at 91-93, 125-26). Officers verified that defendant lived 
there (Tr. I at 126-27). 
Detective Stubbs obtained a search warrant and, 
together with four other detectives, served it on the apartment 
at 2:00 p.m. on June 18 (Tr. I at 125, 127-28, 163-64). Although 
defendant's brother answered the door and denied that defendant 
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was there, the officers found defendant in one of the bedrooms 
(Tr. I at 128, 132, 164-65, 167). Detective Stubbs placed 
defendant under arrest and began to explain to him that the 
arrest was for the robbery of the Kar Kwik at Seventh and 
Washington, and that the officers were there with a search 
warrant to search the apartment for the coat and the scissors 
that were used in the robbery (Tr. I at 132-33, 142-43, 167-69). 
Defendant, appearing "quite upset", interrupted the detective to 
tell him that the coat was in the closet, he would plead guilty, 
and he had thrown the scissors somewhere but could not remember 
where because he had been "coked up" (Tr. I at 133-34, 143, 170). 
Detective Stubbs stopped defendant's statement and read him his 
rights pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 
1602 (1966), after which they had no further conversation (Tr. I 
at 135-37, 143, 173, 204). Defendant admitted ownership of the 
blue jacket retrieved from the apartment (Tr. I at 143-44; Tr. II 
at 25, 28), and the jacket was positively identified by Hoth and 
Mrs. Benally as the one worn by the robber and by Herrera as the 
one worn by defendant on the night of June 16 (Tr. I at 22-23, 
67-68, 76, 88-89). The scissors were not found (Tr. I at 175). 
Sometime between June 17 and June 22, Detective Stubbs 
met with Mrs. Benally, at which time she admitted that she had 
realized that the man she had initially identified "didn't even 
fit the description she had just given the police, and that 
description was an accurate description and she realized that she 
had, in fact, screwed up and the person she had said -- Melvin 
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White — was not a good identification [sic]" (Tr. I at 182, 185-
86). 
On June 22, 1991, Detective Stubbs arranged for a photo 
spread to be shown separately to Mrs. Benally and to Hoth (Tr. I 
at 68, 145, 179-80). The spread included a picture of defendant 
and six other individuals, at least two of whom were black and 
had been picked up the night of the robbery (Tr. I at 145, 180-
81).2 Because of Mrs. Benally's comments and the fact that 
White had an alibi, White was no longer a suspect in the robbery 
and his picture was not included in the photo spread (Tr. I at 
160, 181, 183, 185-86). Detective Stubbs handed the photos to 
Mrs. Benally and to Hoth and asked them if anyone looked familiar 
(Tr. I at 52, 68, 147, 179-80). Both Mrs. Benally and Hoth 
selected defendant's picture from those in the spread (Tr. I at 
52-53, 68-69, 145-47). They also provided positive 
identifications of defendant and his jacket at trial (Tr. I at 
22-23, 27, 62-63, 67-68, 76). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to 
establish that he committed the Kar Kwik robbery. The victim's 
initial identification of Marvin White was fully explained to the 
jury, as was her subsequent identification of defendant and her 
2
 The night of the robbery, White professed his innocence to 
Detective Stubbs for the Kar Kwik robbery, but incriminated several 
other individuals in other robberies under investigation by the 
police (Tr. I at 119-20). As a result, four other individuals were 
arrested that night, both because of their involvement in the other 
robberies and the possibility that one or more was involved in the 
Kar Kwik robbery (Tr. I at 120-21, 160-61). 
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confidence in that identification. Aside from the positive 
identification at trial of defendant and his jacket by both the 
victim and her co-worker, the jury heard from Gayle Herrera. 
Within hours of the robbery, she placed defendant at the location 
of the robbery at the appropriate time and day, provided numerous 
details concerning the robber and the robbery which had not been 
revealed by the police or the victim, helped the police locate 
defendant, and, at trial, positively identified defendant and his 
jacket. The jury was free to believe the testimony and, together 
with an incriminating confession made by defendant when he was 
placed under arrest, had sufficient evidence upon which to base 
the conviction for aggravated robbery. 
A search warrant was executed at the same time 
defendant was arrested. The arresting officer's brief, factual 
explanation of the basis for the arrest and the authority for and 
purpose of the search warrant, made immediately upon arrest and 
immediately before he gave defendant the Miranda warning, did not 
constitute interrogation or the functional equivalent of 
interrogation. Accordingly, the incriminating confession 
volunteered by defendant before the officer read the Miranda 
warning was not the result of compelling influence by the police, 
and its admission did not violate either the Fifth or the 
Fourteenth Amendment. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED AT TRIAL, AND THE 
REASONABLE INFERENCES THEREFROM, SUPPORT THE 
CONVICTION FOR AGGRAVATED ROBBERY 
Defendant contends that the evidence presented below is 
insufficient to warrant a conviction for aggravated robbery 
because Mrs. Benally's identification of defendant as the robber 
was unbelievable due to police coersion and the initial 
identification of another suspect, and because the evidence 
together with the tenuous identification does not conclusively 
establish that it was defendant who committed the robbery (Br. of 
App. at 13-15)• 
On appeal, this claim is evaluated by viewing the 
evidence in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict. 
State v. Lemons, 844 P.2d 378, 378 (Utah App. 1992); State v. 
Perdue, 813 P.2d 1201, 1202 (Utah App. 1991). Accord State v. 
Burk, 839 P.2d 880, 884 (Utah App. 1992). Reversal is warranted 
"only when the evidence, so viewed, is sufficiently inconclusive 
or inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have 
entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the 
crime of which he was convicted." Burk, 839 P.2d at 884 (quoting 
State v. Salas, 820 P.2d 1386, 1387 (Utah App. 1991)); see also 
State v. Whittle, 780 P.2d 819, 821 (Utah 1989). Accord State v. 
Vioil, 840 P.2d 788, 792-93 (Utah App. 1992). 
Defendant does not challenge the fact that a robbery 
occurred (Br. of App. at 9). He argues that the evidence did not 
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establish that he committed itf primarily because Mrs. Benally's 
identification of him as the robber was unbelievable. Defendant 
claims that the victim's identification was unbelievable because 
she initially identified another man as the robber, she did not 
change her mind until several days after the robbery, the change 
resulted from what defendant has characterized as deliberate 
persuasion by the police, and her identification of defendant 
from the photo spread did not allow her to compare a picture of 
defendant with a picture of Marvin White. 
A. The Credibility to be Given the Victim's Identification 
of Defendant as the Robber is a Matter for the Jury to Decide 
Defendant's challenge centers largely on Mrs. Benally's 
identification testimony and attacks only the credibility of the 
testimony. He seeks to have this Court reassess the jury's 
credibility determination, claiming that "the jury gave 
unreasonable credibility to the testimony of Mrs. Benally in 
believing her identification of the Defendant" (Br. of App. at 
13). This Court defers to the trier-of-fact's assessment of 
witness credibility. Vigil, 840 P.2d at 793 ("It is within the 
province of the jury to decide whether or not to believe 
witnesses in light of their prior inconsistent statements."); 
State v. Wright, 744 P.2d 315, 317, 319 (Utah App. 1987); see 
also State v. Baglev, 681 P.2d 1242, 1244 (Utah 1984). The jury 
is free to believe or disbelieve all or part of any witness' 
testimony. State v. Jonas, 793 P.2d 902, 904-05 (Utah App.), 
cert, denied, 804 P.2d 1232 (Utah 1990); see also State v. 
Pierce, 722 P.2d 780, 781 (Utah 1986). 
12 
The jury had before it ample information surrounding 
Mrs. Benally's identification of defendant from which to make its 
credibility determination. The facts behind her initial 
identification of White and later identification of defendant 
permeated the trial from opening statements through closing 
arguments. Mrs. Benally freely admitted her mistake, explaining 
that at the time she identified White—within an hour and a half 
of the robbery—she was nervous, she had not calmed down, and her 
excited state contributed to her mistaken identification (Tr. I 
at 26, 50-51, 58-59). Once she had calmed down and reflected on 
the situation, she realized her mistake. In her meeting with 
Detective Stubbs between June 17, when she gave her statement to 
the police, and June 22, when she reviewed the photo spread and 
first identified defendant, Mrs. Benally acknowledged her mistake 
(Tr. I at 185-86). Stubbs testified that at the meeting Mrs. 
Benally was calm and was under no pressure (Tr. I at 185). She 
freely explained to him that "[t]he man she was looking at 
[White] didn't even fit the description she had just given the 
police, and that description was an accurate description and she 
realized that she had, in fact, screwed up and the person she had 
said — Melvin White — was not a good identification" (Tr. I at 
185-86). Thereafter, Mrs. Benally chose defendant's photo from 
the photo spread on June 22, positively identified him at the 
preliminary hearing on June 25 and at trial on September 3, and 
indicated that she was "completely satisfied" and certain that 
defendant was the man who had robbed her (Tr. I at 27, 54, 184). 
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She also positively identified defendant's jacket as the one worn 
by the robber (Tr. I at 22-23, 55-58). The jury apparently found 
her explanation to be credible, and this Court should not disturb 
that credibility assessment. 
The record does not support defendant's claim that the 
police either affirmatively persuaded or "deliberately and 
conscientiously convinced" Mrs. Benally that her identification 
of White was mistaken (Br. of App. at 9-10). Based on his 
fifteen years of police work, Detective Stubbs routinely 
questioned witness identifications, believing them to be the 
weakest link in any case (Tr. I at 113, 118). Moreover, he did 
not believe that White specifically fit the description given by 
Mrs. Benally over the telephone, he questioned the timeframe for 
travel between the location of the robbery and the place where 
White was initially detained, and he learned that White had 
provided an alibi, which was later corroborated (Tr. I at 116-18, 
123, 160). Accordingly, when he first met with Mrs. Benally at 
the police station following her initial identification of White, 
he questioned the strength of her identification by trying "to 
shake" it (Tr. I at 118, 153-54). He determined that although 
she was not positive about her identification, she felt White may 
well be the robber (.id. ). Her discussion with Detective Stubbs 
had little, if any, lasting impact, however. Immediately after 
meeting with Stubbs, Mrs. Benally saw White walking down the 
hallway of the police station, after which she gave her statement 
to the police in which she reiterated that she felt sure that 
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White was the robber (Tr. I at 25-26, 42-45, 48-50, 155}- The 
record does not reflect that Mrs. Benally had any further contact 
with the police until she met with Detective Stubbs in the 
following days and recanted her identification of White. She was 
not informed that the police did not believe that White was 
involved or that White had provided an alibi (Tr. I at 52). 
Accordingly, defendant's theory of police coersion in the 
identification process has no support in the record. 
The mere fact that White's photo was not included in 
the photo spread does not mean that any credibility accorded Mrs. 
Benally's identification of defendant was "unreasonable[.]"3 
Neither the police nor the victim believed White was a suspect at 
the time the photo spread occurred on June 22, so his photograph 
was not included (Tr. I at 160, 181, 183, 185-86). Mrs. Benally 
had seen White twice prior to the photo spread and was fully able 
to compare the image of White in her mind's eye with the 
photograph of defendant she chose from the photo spread. The 
photo spread was admitted into evidence (Tr. I at 185), and the 
jury was allowed to consider the impact the absence of White's 
picture may have had on the credibility and weight to be given 
Mrs. Benally's identification testimony. The jury could 
reasonably credit Mrs. Benally's identification of defendant, and 
3
 The record suggests that Mrs. Benally was given an 
opportunity to compare White's picture to defendant's at some point 
after the June 22 photo spread (Tr. I at 52-53), although Detective 
Stubbs testified that he did not show the victim a photo of White 
at any time (Tr. I at 181). It is clear that White's photo was not 
included in the photo spread conducted on June 22 (Tr. I at 181, 
183). 
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this Court should defer to that determination. Wright, 744 P.2d 
at 317, 319. 
B. The Remaining Evidence Involves Credibility 
Determinations Properly Left to the Jury 
The record clearly illustrates that there is no merit 
to defendant's claim that the jury was expected to presume his 
guilt solely from his "tenuous" identification as the robber (Br. 
of App. at 14-15).A In addition to Mrs. Benally's positive 
identification of defendant and his jacket at trial, the jury 
also considered Brent Hoth's identification of defendant and his 
jacket, Gayle Herrera's testimony regarding the evening of the 
robbery, and defendant's spontaneous confession. 
Defendant challenges the credibility of Hoth's 
identification, arguing that Hoth did not get a good look at the 
robber, provided only a general description of the robber and his 
jacket to the police, and was not given the opportunity to 
compare defendant's photo with one of Marvin White (Br. of App. 
at 13-14). Nothing in the record indicates that Hoth's 
identification was hesitant, uncertain, or otherwise unreliable. 
At trial, Hoth positively identified both defendant and his 
jacket, recognizing that although "you can never be totally 
sure[,]" he was "[a]s sure as [he] can be" that defendant was the 
person who robbed the Kar Kwik (Tr. I at 62-63, 67-69). He 
A
 Defendant's reference to the improper jury instruction 
struck down in Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 99 S. Ct. 2450 
(1979), is irrelevant to this appeal (Br. of App. at 14). The jury 
was not instructed that "The law presumes that a person intends the 
ordinary consequences of his voluntary acts." 
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testified that Mrs. Benally probably had a better view of the 
robber than himself because she was closer to him (Tr. I at 69-
70). However, he maintained that he got a good look at the 
robber from the customer's side of the counter while the robber 
was standing next to Mrs. Benally by the cash register on the 
other side of the counter (Tr. I at 14, 16-17, 20-21, 62-64, 69). 
He also selected defendant's picture from those in the photo 
spread conducted six days after the robbery (Tr. I at 68-69, 145-
46). The fact that he was not asked to view a man who had been 
eliminated as a suspect in the robbery does not render his 
identification unbelievable, but is a factor to be considered by 
the jury in determining the credibility and weight to be given 
Hoth's testimony, as defendant argued to the jury in closing 
arguments (Tr. II at 64-66). 
The jury did not have to fully credit the 
identification testimony of either Hoth or Mrs. Benally in order 
to convict defendant of robbery because the remaining evidence 
alone more than adequately supports the conviction. Defendant 
minimizes Gayle Herrera's testimony, pointing out that she did 
not have any personal knowledge that defendant entered Kar Kwik 
on the night of the robbery or that he actually robbed the store 
(Br. of App. at 10-11). Herrera's testimony is fully set forth 
in the Statement of Facts, infra, and need only be summarized 
here. Her testimony placed defendant at the scene of the robbery 
around the time it occurred after he had used cocaine (Tr. I at 
82-83, 85). Approximately six hours after the robbery, she 
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entered the police station and described to Detective Stubbs, 
without prompting, details concerning the only robbery to have 
occurred in Ogden on June 16, including the location of the 
crime, the use of scissors, a description of defendant's 
clothing, and a physical description of defendant, all accurately 
matching the details of the Kar Kwik robbery and the description 
of the robber (Tr. I at 85-89, 91, 93-94, 124). She also 
described defendant's car and part of its license plate, both of 
which she helped to locate the following day and which were 
traced to defendant (Tr. I at 91-93, 125-26). She later helped 
Detective Stubbs locate defendant and verified that he was the 
man she was with on June 16 (Tr. at 91-93, 125). 
Defendant's trial testimony largely corroborated 
Herrera's testimony. They both testified that they met when 
defendant let Herrera use his Cearfield apartment to exchange sex 
for cocaine with a drug dealer named Half Pint (Tr. I at 99-100, 
189-90; Tr. II at 3-6, 8-9); that, at Herrera's request, 
defendant stole Half Pint's money and drugs and sent him back to 
Ogden on foot (Tr. I at 100-01, 190-92; Tr. II at 9-10, 14-15, 
17-18); that they both used the stolen drugs until they were 
gone, then drove around looking for more drugs, making several 
stops in Ogden in the process (Tr. I at 85, 89, 102, 192, 194-95; 
Tr. II at 18-21); that shortly before Herrera visited Detective 
Stubbs, she and defendant had sex, during which Herrera got mad 
at defendant and had him drop her off at 25th and Washington in 
Ogden, where the police department is located (Tr. I at 86, 90-
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91, 102-03, 191-94; Tr. II at 22-23). However, defendant denied 
that they stopped at Kar Kwik and testified that he did not know 
Herrera until 3:00 p.m. on June 17 (Tr. I at 191, 195, 204; Tr. 
II at 3-4, 29-31). He gave no explanation for Herrera's ability 
to provide the police with his physical description and a 
description of his car, his jacket, their meeting, and their 
activities together hours before they met. Moreover, defendant 
made no attempt to establish his actions on June 16 (Tr. II at 
7), relying instead on the general defense that all the witnesses 
were lying and he did not commit the crime. 
Finally, the spontaneous confession made by defendant 
when he was arrested corroborated Herrera's description of 
defendant's jacket, his use of scissors, and his use of cocaine 
in connection with the robbery.5 The confession, together with 
Herrera's testimony, provide ample persuasive evidence from which 
the jury could find that defendant had committed the robbery. 
The jury had before it substantial evidence connecting 
defendant to the crime and establishing defendant's culpability. 
Viewed in a light most favorable to the jury verdict, the 
evidence and the reasonable inferences therefrom provide 
overwhelming support for the aggravated robbery conviction. 
Hence, defendant's insufficiency claim is without merit. See 
Vigil, 840 P.2d at 794; State v. Boone, 820 P.2d 930, 937 (Utah 
App. 1991); State v. Clark, 783 P.2d 68, 70 (Utah App. 1989). 
5
 The admissibility of the confession is challenged in Point 
II, supra, and the substance is set forth at page 20, supra. 
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POINT II 
THE ARRESTING OFFICER'S BRIEF DISCLOSURE OF 
THE BASIS FOR THE ARREST AND THE AUTHORITY 
AND PURPOSE BEHIND THE SEARCH WARRANT 
CONSTITUTED NEITHER INTERROGATION NOR ITS 
FUNCTIONAL EQUIVALENT; HENCE, ADMISSION OF 
DEFENDANT'S SPONTANEOUS PRE-MIRANDA 
CONFESSION WAS PROPER 
When the police served the search warrant at the 
apartment where defendant was staying, Detective Stubbs found 
defendant in one of the bedrooms and immediately placed him under 
arrest (Tr. I at 128, 132-33, 142, 167-68)- Stubbs briefly told 
defendant who he was and that the officers were from the Ogden 
Police Department (Tr. I at 132-33, 142). Stubbs said that he 
"was investigating the Kar Kwik robbery at 7th and Washington, 
that [defendant] did it . . . [and] that the person driving 
[defendant's] car had given him up" (Tr. I at 133, 143, 167-68). 
He then explained that he had a search warrant and "was going to 
search the house for the coat and the scissors that were used in 
the robbery" (Tr. I at 133, 143, 168-69). At this point, 
defendant broke into Detective Stubbs' explanation and 
volunteered: 
The coat's in the closet. I'm — I was coked 
up at the time. I'll plead guilty. I threw 
the scissors somewhere, but I don't know 
where because I [was] coked up[.] 
(Tr. I at 133-34, 143, 169-70). Detective Stubbs interrupted 
defendant to read him his rights pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, 
384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602 (1966) (Tr. I at 135-36, 143, 172-
73). Defendant made no further comments (Tr. I at 136-37, 143, 
173, 204). 
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Defendant contends that the trial court erred in 
denying his motion to suppress the post-arrest confession he made 
to Detective Stubbs, claiming that the statement was the 
involuntary result of custodial police interrogation or its 
functional equivalent in violation of Miranda, thereby rendering 
the statement inadmissible under both the federal and state 
constitutions (Br. of App. at 15, 17-19). 
Although defendant's brief refers to both the state and 
federal constitution, he did not raise a state constitutional 
claim below, offers no basis for independent reliance on or an 
expanded reading of the state constitution, and does not argue 
that either exceptional circumstances or plain error exist. 
Accordingly, this Court need only address the federal 
constitution.6 State v. Jensen, 818 P.2d 551, 552 n.2 (Utah 
1991) (defendant placed no independent reliance on the state 
constitution); State v. Miller, 829 P.2d 132, 135 (Utah App.) 
(state constitutional argument regarding admissibility of 
confessions was not preserved below and no exception to the 
waiver rule was presented on appeal), cert, denied, 836 P.2d 1383 
(Utah 1992); State v. Archambeau, 820 P.2d 920, 927 n.13 (Utah 
App. 1991) (defendant provided no independent state 
constitutional analysis); State v. Johnson, 771 P.2d 326, 327-28 
(Utah App. 1989) (defendant failed to raise the state 
6
 The record indicates that the issue was discussed by the 
court and both counsel at the beginning of the trial (Tr. I at 130, 
138; a copy is attached as Addendum B). However, the substance of 
the discussion was not recorded and no written memoranda on the 
issue appear in the file. 
21 
constitutional issue below), rev'd. on other grounds, 805 P.2d 
761 (Utah 1991); see, e.g., State v. Laffertv, 749 P.2d 1239, 
1247 n.5 (Utah 1988) ("As a general rule, we will not engage in 
state constitutional analysis unless an argument for different 
analyses under the state and federal constitutions is briefed*"), 
cert, denied, U.S. , 112 S. Ct. 1942 (1992); State v. 
Earl, 716 P.2d 803, 805-06 (Utah 1986). 
"This Court reviews the factual findings underlying the 
denial of a motion to suppress evidence under a 'clearly 
erroneous' standard, and reviews the trial court's conclusions of 
law based thereon for correctness." State v. Gray, 211 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 40, 41 (Utah App. Apr. 22, 1993) (quoting State v. Brooks, 
209 Utah Adv. Rep. 43 (Utah App. Mar. 22, 1993)); see also State 
v. Brown, 201 Utah Adv. Rep. 4, 6 (Utah Nov. 30, 1992). The 
ultimate question of whether police comment or conduct was, under 
the totality of the circumstances, so likely to evoke an 
incriminating response that it constituted interrogation under 
Miranda is a factual determination, reviewed on appeal for clear 
error. Lavton City v. Aragon, 813 P.2d 1213, 1215-16 (Utah App. 
1991); see State v. Singer, 815 P.2d 1303, 1311-12 (Utah App. 
1991). But see United States v. Wauneka, 770 F.2d 1434, 1438 
(9th Cir. 1985) (the issue is a mixed question of law and fact). 
It is clear that 
the prosecution may not use statements, 
whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming 
from custodial interrogation of the defendant 
unless it demonstrates the use of procedural 
safeguards effective to secure the privilege 
against self-incrimination. By custodial 
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interrogation, we mean questioning initiated 
by law enforcement officers after a person 
has been taken into custody or otherwise 
deprived of his freedom of action in any 
significant way. 
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444, 86 S. Ct. at 1612 (footnote omitted). 
This is not to say that a failure to give Miranda warnings 
immediately upon making an arrest requires suppression of all 
post-arrest statements made prior to the Miranda warning. See 
Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 299, 100 S. Ct. 1682, 1689 
(1980); State v. Wilson, 701 P.2d 1058, 1059 (Utah 1985); State 
v. Valdez, 30 Utah 2d 54, 58, 513 P.2d 422, 425 (Utah 1973); 
Araqon, 813 P.2d at 1214-15. Miranda safeguards come into effect 
only when a suspect who is in custody is subjected to 
interrogation. Innis, 446 U.S. at 300-01, 100 S. Ct. at 1689-90; 
Araqon, 813 P.2d at 1214. Absent interrogation, defendant is not 
entitled to the Miranda safeguards, and his voluntary, post-
arrest statements are admissible. Arizona v. Mauro, 481 U.S. 
520, 527-30, 107 S. Ct. 1931, 1935-37 (1987); Innis, 446 U.S. at 
302-04, 100 S. Ct. at 1690-91; Wilson, 701 P.2d at 1059; Valdez, 
30 Utah 2d at 58, 513 P.2d at 425.7 
7
 Defendant raises on appeal the voluntariness of his 
confession (Br. of App. at 18-19). Defendant's argument below 
focused solely on whether the officer's actions constituted the 
functional equivalent of interrogation (Tr. I at 137-40). His 
representation to the court that his confession "was in the nature 
of a spontaneous kind of remark" does not suggest that he 
challenged its voluntariness (Tr. I. at 140). As the issue of 
voluntariness was not put before the trial court and defendant does 
not argue for any exception to the waiver rule, the issue has not 
been preserved for this Court's review. See Gray, 211 Utah Adv. 
Rep. at 47 n.5; State v. Scheel, 823 P.2d 470, 473-74 (Utah App. 
1991). 
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The record establishes that defendant was in custody at 
the time the confession was made (Tr. I at 132-33, 135-37, 142-
43/ 167-68)/ and that he had not yet received his Miranda rights 
(Tr. I at 132-36/ 142-43/ 172). Hence, the issue is whether 
defendant was subjected to interrogation by Detective Stubbs 
which would render his confession inadmissible. In denying 
defendant's verbal motion to suppress the confession, the trial 
court found: 
Since this was not in response to 
interrogation, and even though it was clearly 
a custodial situation, the Court believes 
that since it was not in response to 
interrogation, the Motion to Suppress is 
denied. 
(Tr. I at 140; a copy of the ruling is attached as Addendum B). 
The United States Supreme Court has defined 
"interrogation" for Miranda purposes as "express questioning or 
its functional equivalent." Innis, 446 U.S. at 300-01, 100 S. 
Ct. at 1689-90; Singer, 815 P.2d at 1311-12. Defendant conceded 
below that Detective Stubbs' brief explanation of the basis for 
the arrest and the presence of the police officers did not 
constitute express questioning (Tr. I at 135, 139). The focus, 
therefore, is on whether defendant was subjected to the 
functional equivalent of interrogation, thereby rendering his 
confession inadmissible. 
The phrase "functional equivalent" in the Miranda 
context refers to "any words or actions on the part of the police 
(other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that 
the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an 
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incriminating response from the suspect." Innis, 446 U.S. at 
301, 100 S. Ct. at 1689-90 (footnotes omitted); Singer, 815 P.2d 
at 1311-12. The likelihood of incrimination must be determined 
from a review of the surrounding circumstances, focusing on the 
defendant's perspective while considering the officers' knowledge 
of the suspect's characteristics. Singer, 815 P.2d at 1311; 
Aragon, 813 P.2d at 1215; see also Mauro, 481 U.S. at 527, 107 S. 
Ct. at 1935; Innis, 446 U.S. at 301, 100 S. Ct. at 1689-90. 
Detective Stubbs' conduct was not the functional 
equivalent of interrogation but instead was "normally attendant 
to arrest and custody[.]" The verbal exchange at issue occurred 
contemporaneously with taking defendant into custody. The 
arresting officer first properly informed defendant of the basis 
for his arrest pursuant to statute: suspicion of robbery of the 
Kar Kwik on Seventh and Washington in Ogden. Utah Code Ann. § 
77-7-6 (1990) ("The person making the arrest shall inform the 
person being arrested of his intention, cause and authority to 
arrest him"); see Wilson, 701 P.2d at 1059 (merely providing the 
arrestee with the information required by this statute prior to 
giving him his Miranda rights does not amount to custodial 
interrogation). Detective Stubbs then explained the authority 
and purpose behind the officers' concurrent search of the 
apartment. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-23-10 (1990) (contemplating 
that, where appropriate, an officer provide notice of his 
authority and purpose in executing a search warrant). Where an 
arrest is made in conjunction with the serving of a search 
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warrant by several officers, this brief explanation is not 
unreasonable and does not carry with it the "measure of 
compulsion above and beyond that inherent in custody itself" 
required to constitute the functional equivalent of interrogation 
for purposes of Miranda, Innis, 446 U.S. at 300, 100 S. Ct. at 
1689. Stubbs' brief explanation is not the type of conduct 
Miranda is intended to prevent. 
Further, Detective Stubbs could not reasonably have 
known that his brief, factual explanation would be reasonably 
likely to elicit any response from defendant, incriminating or 
otherwise. Defendant offers no insight from his own perspective 
to justify his claim that Detective Stubbs' explanation of the 
arrest and the search warrant, without more, produced his 
confession.8 Defendant testified that he was not under the 
influence of cocaine at the time of his arrest (Tr. I at 202), 
and he offers no evidence that he was otherwise unusually 
susceptible to the officer's brief explanation of the immediate 
situation. Aside from denying that he made the statement (Tr. I 
at 202-03; Tr. II at 25-28), defendant claimed at trial that at 
the time of his arrest and throughout the search of the apartment 
8
 His characterization of Stubbs' conduct as accusatory 
instead of investigatory confuses the situation at hand with one in 
which a defendant challenges admission of pre-arrest statements 
(Br. of App. at 18). One of the relevant factors used to determine 
whether an individual who has not been arrested has been subjected 
to custodial interrogation is whether the investigation has focused 
on the accused, i.e., whether the questioning turned from 
investigatory to accusatory. See State v. Kelly, 718 P.2d 385, 391 
(Utah 1986); State v. Sampson, 808 P.2d 1100, 1105 (Utah App. 
1990), cert, denied, 817 P.2d 327 (Utah 1991), and cert, denied, 
U.S. , 112 S. Ct. 1282 (1992). 
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he rationally continued to assert his innocence in the face of 
what he characterized as badgering from Detective Stubbs, and 
repeatedly voiced his concern that the officers not destroy his 
brother's apartment (Tr. I at 199-203; Tr. II at 25-26). Nothing 
in defendant's testimony provides any basis for finding that 
defendant felt compelled to confess because of Stubbs' brief 
recitation* 
Moreover, nothing in the record suggests that Detective 
Stubbs knew that defendant was peculiarly susceptible to a 
factual disclosure of the immediate situation. Defendant had no 
police record (Tr. I at 203-04), and the only information about 
defendant known to Detective Stubbs prior to the arrest was the 
information Herrera had told him the previous morning (Tr. I at 
123, 161-62). While the officer observed that defendant looked 
understandably nervous and scared when he was arrested, a factor 
generally inherent in arrest situations, nothing suggests that 
defendant appeared unusually disoriented or upset (Tr. I at 133-
34, 170-72) The officer did not pause to obtain a response to 
his explanation but was interrupted by defendant, suggesting that 
the factual recitation was not designed to elicit any response 
from defendant but rather to briefly inform him of the basic 
information necessary to understand the immediate situation in 
which defendant found himself. There is no evidence of the use 
of compelling influences or psychological ploys to obtain a 
comment from defendant. Without more, the mere recitation of the 
basis for defendant's arrest and the subject of the search is not 
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commentary which the police should know is reasonably likely to 
prompt an incriminating response from defendant. See United 
States v. Gav, 774 F.2d 368, 379 (10th Cir. 1985) (comment of 
police in searching a container that it contained "cocaine, too" 
did not constitute a comment which the police "should have known 
[was] reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response"). 
The officer's disclosures were brief, factual, direct, 
and not unusually coersive, unnecessarily forceful or in any way 
threatening so as to prompt a response from defendant. Hence, 
Detective Stubbs' remarks did not constitute interrogation, and 
Miranda was not violated. See Wilson, 701 P.2d at 1059; see also 
Mauro, 481 U.S. at 529-30, 107 S. Ct. at 1936-37; Gay;/ 774 F.2d 
at 379; Valdez, 30 Utah 2d at 58, 513 P.2d at 425. Accordingly, 
defendant's spontaneous confession was admissible, and the trial 
court correctly denied defendant's motion to suppress. Mauro, 
481 U.S. at 530, 107 S. Ct. at 1937; Innis, 446 U.S. 302-04, 100 
S. Ct. at 1690-91; Wilson, 701 P.2d at 1059. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully 
requests that this Court affirm defendant's conviction and 
sentence. -*/ 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this (S/ day of May, 1993. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Attorney/Genera1 
r 
KRIS C. LEONARD 
Assistant Attorney General 
28 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and accurate copy of the 
foregoing Brief of Appellee was mailed, postage prepaid, to John 
T. Caine, attorney for appellant, Public Defender Association, 
2568 Washington Blvd., Ogden, Utah 84401, this 
1993. 
day of May, 
^*4j07lrf> 
29 
ADDENDA 
ADDENDUM A 
SUPREME COURT OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 
December 15, 1992 
'V0* 
OFFICE OF THE CLERK 
R. Paul VanDam 
OFFICE OF ATTORNEY GENERAL 
23 6 State Capitol Bldg. 
BUILDING MAIL 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Claude L. Hayes, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
No, 920465 
921900330 
Pursuant to the authority vested in this Court, this case 
is poured-over to the Court of Appeals for disposition. 
All further pleadings and correspondence should be directed to 
that Court. The address is 230 South 500 East, Suite 400, Salt 
Lake City, Utah 84102. 
Geoffrey J. Butler 
Clerk 
/ 
DEC 1 6 92 
"
T:V-C=TK: 
\ 
ADDENDUM B 
13 
For the record, we discussed this matter with 
the Court at the opening of the trial. It's with 
respect to the area that we're at now in Detective 
Stubbs' testimony that he is — at least the 
prosecutor intends to elicit a statement from 
Detective Stubbs that ~ that the defendant, Claude 
Hayes, allegedly made — which would certainly be, 
by any stretch of the imagination, felt to be 
incriminating, 
I indicated to the Court at that time that I 
felt that the statement was taken in violation of 
Miranda. And the Court made a preliminary ruling, 
based upon the representations of the police report 
that were made. And we asked to have this hearing, 
at least to clarify it for the record. 
And so for that purpose, I'll ask Detective 
Stubbs, with the Court's permission, some questions. 
THE COURT: Yes, you may. 
EXAMINATION 
(Still out of the hearing of the jury.) 
BY MR. CAINE: 
Q. John, I'm looking at — have you got your 
handwritten report up there with you? 
A. I do. 
Q. I'm looking at page three — it says page three 
Laurie Shingle, C.S.R. 
(801) 399-8510 
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once you Mirandized him in the context of this 
circumstance that we've just discussed, he made no 
further statements concerning his involvement, 
allegedly, in the Kar Kvik robbery. 
A. Correct. 
Q. All right. And no further statements were taken 
from him by you at a later date. 
A. Correct. 
Q. In connection with this. 
MR. CAINE: That's all I have, Your 
Honor. 
Do you have some questions? 
MR. DAROCZI: No. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. CAINE: Having said that, in the 
time between that I had, the small time at lunch — 
and I didn't get a chance to eat, which I'll discuss 
with the Court later ~ 
THE COURT: Well, you've been saving 
up for that for years. 
MR. CAINE: Yes, I know. I knew it 
wouldn't break your heart, Your Honor. 
I had a chance to review the -• what I believe 
at least to be — the current view of the United 
States Supreme Court and the Utah Supreme Court in 
Laurie Shingle, C.S.R. 
(801) 399-8510 
138 
this area. And I#ll acknowledge that the Court's 
preliminary view this morning is accurate to this 
extent, and that is that clearly the courts have said 
that ^ extemporaneous or ~ or expostulative type 
statements that are just thrown out are not 
considered to be in violation of Miranda. 
But these cases also -- particularly Gates 
against Illinois which was the big — the big one 
where they talk about making some changes and some 
others — the clear implication is that police 
officers need to be very careful in these areas, and 
that the courts have the right to look at all of the 
totality of what happened and make a decision as to 
whether in this case it did violate Miranda. 
And I would suggest in this case that while 
it's clearly — at least as described by Detective 
Stubbs — it#s clearly in the nature of — of 
something coming out, not necessarily in response to 
a direct question, you do have the other elements 
that are significant. You have a person who's 
clearly placed under arrest. No question about that. 
This isn't even a detention situation. He's under 
arrest. 
Secondly, he's told, I believe, in effect, you 
committed a robbery. Not only do I believe you 
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committed it, but I believe you did it with a pair of 
scissors and — and you were wearing a jacket and I'm 
here to get them. You know, and that's why I'm h€ 
and that's where we are. 
Now, while that isn't ~ while that isn't 
interrogation, I suppose, in the classic sense, it 
certainly is everything else. You've now got the 
suspect there, he's in custody. He's detained; he's 
under arrest. He's told what — what happened, what 
he's accused of and what he supposedly did it with 
and that they're there to get these things. 
If that isn't a situation which, in effect, at 
that point, a careful reading — and Detective 
Stubbs, I think, honestly says, as soon as he -- as 
soon as he says that, I knew I better do this by the 
numbers. And I think that's — that's a totally 
honest statement. As soon as he said that, I stopped 
everything rather than let him go on and say 
something else. He then Mirandizes him. 
And then ~ then the critical thing here is 
once Miranda is given, the defendant stops talking. 
And so the issue is, in a careful consideration, and 
given the nature of the confrontational 
circumstances — that it clearly was — while it 
might not have been interrogation, it was 
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confrontation at that point. No question about it. 
This wasn't just a, well, you may be a suspect, and 
then it comes out. 
You're it, I'm here, I got you, in effect. 
And then a statement is made and then immediately we 
go to Miranda. It seems to me that this does fall 
within the gambit of requiring that Miranda should 
have been given as soon as that arrest was made and 
the defendant was told exactly why they were there. 
It's my view then that anything he said 
subsequent to that time, even though it was in the 
nature of a spontaneous kind of remark, we should 
suppress it. And that's our motion. 
MR. DAROCZI: I'll submit it, Your 
Honor. 
THE COURT: Very well. 
I don't think it would be appropriate for the 
Court to extend Miranda beyond the boundaries that 
have been laid down by both federal and state courts. 
Since this was not in response to interrogation, and 
even though it was clearly a custodial situation, the 
Court believes that since it was not in response to 
interrogation, the Motion to Suppress is denied. 
MR. CAINE: Thank you. 
MR. DAROCZI: Your Honor, I do 
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